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I. Soft Law
The subject matter of traditional international law is the entitlements and obligations of states inter se. Yet judging from the spate of articles in the past few years about soft law, one might think that classical international law has been dislodged. In a forthcoming chapter in The Philosophy of International Law (Oxford Univ. Press), Samantha Besson discusses the sources of international law as if the product of those sources is soft law exclusively. She regards soft law as the norms that arise from, and then apply to, individuals, organizations, and states. Furthermore, we find that the sources of soft law are far more bountiful than the triumvirate hard-law sources of custom, convention, and general principles.
Besson does not claim that when a norm of soft law conflicts with a norm of hard law, soft law trumps hard law. Rather, both sets of norms co-exist. In any event, we learn that the instrumental relation between soft and hard law is less important than the great difference in their goals. The goals, Besson assures us, involve facilitating a new world order based on co-operation, coexistence, democracy, morality, and justice. Goals such as these tend to make a putative critic of soft law feel like the Grinch who stole Christmas.
A. Provenance
Whence the concept of soft law? In 1926 Vladimir Vernadsky hypothesized that the Earth has gone through three stages: the geosphere (inanimate matter), the biosphere (life forms), and the noösphere (human cognition).
1 Just as the emergence of life fundamentally transformed the geosphere, the emergence of human cognition transformed the biosphere. Three decades later a theologian, Teilhard de Chardin, contended that the noösphere has evolved from the interaction of human thoughts into a 1 Vladimir Vernadsky, The Biosphere (Synergetic Press, 1986 ).
transhuman consciousness. 2 For Teilhard, the ideas and their interactions that made up the noösphere were a greater reality than the humans who conceived them.
Another three decades passed when the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann took a more practical approach to the noösphere. He argued that ideational reality is achieved through communications. The world we live in is the social construct of these communications. According to the legal sociologist Gunther Teubner, the essentially egalitarian and horizontal character of communications led Luhmann to present world society "as a society without hierarchy and without a sovereign." 3 Luhmann found no need for statist mechanisms to evaluate or select from conflicting communications, for in his theory the social system is self-regulating. 4 Its internal needs and functions are bordered by a filter that allows a few select environmental communications to osmose into the system. 5 Significantly from the standpoint of international law, Luhmann's social system transcends geopolitical boundaries (communications do not respect borders) and hence like customary international law it fills the global plenum.
B. Goals
Students of soft law are repelled by the sluggish pace of traditional international law in advancing human rights and protecting the global ecosystem. In the political arena, they find that traditional law bends too readily to accommodate transboundary projections of armed force. States seem to be arbitrarily mapped land masses that cling to international law for whatever protection it gives them from the intrusions of other states.
Enter soft law: a kind of strange attractor that influences the direction of the traditional vectors of international law into a noösphere where the norms are disconnected from idiosyncratic state interests and state power, leaving them free to self-aggregate into a omnium of norms. As norms, they are somehow purer than the harsh reality of state practice that either drags behind them or ignores them.
If we could travel through the noösphere, what would be the content of the norms that we would encounter? If Samantha Besson were our tour guide, we would see only norms that call for peace, justice, morality, co-existence, cooperation, multilateralism, pluralism, and democracy. If such norms were to take over or pre-empt any area presently governed by traditional international law, then that area would perforce be improved.
Although Besson does not indicate the mechanism by which norms of soft law can come down and preempt norms of hard law, she is entitled to claim that to the extent of any such preemption it happens for the best.
But the flaw in her theory is her selectivity as a tour guide. The noösphere is not just filled with facilitative norms; it also contains norms that oppose the facilitative norms.
For example, if there are a billion permissive norms in favor of abortion, there could be a billion prohibitive norms that call it murder. Conflicting norms would be generated in a public relations battle by the gun-control lobby against the gun-ownership lobby. We may encounter norms advocating the legalization of narcotics and opposing norms calling for a war on drugs. There are norms on both sides of sports hunting, whaling, homosexuality, pornography, corporal punishment of children, female genital mutilation, public or private education, and progressive income taxation. The Sha'ria law, covering a billion people in Islamic countries, sends up many billions of norms that say a woman's testimony in court is worth one-half that of a man's testimony. Should the Sha'ria norms be discriminated against when they clash with norms from other countries that treat men and women equally? In international relations we find norms that allow or prohibit unilateral humanitarian intervention, transboundary abduction, patent and copyright protection, and nuclear proliferation. If this hodgepodge of norms were brought to Earth and actualized as binding international law, the result at best would be a stand-off and at worst the end of the rule of law.
C. Filters
Suppose, however, that a filter could be devised that would allow the norms approved by Besson to pass through while blocking the contrary norms. The resulting shower of purely facilitative norms upon the Earth could only lead to legal improvements and legal reform. As we have seen, Besson does not provide a filter; she trusts that soft law will co-exist with hard law by filling in unoccupied areas and gaps in the traditional legal system. But coexistence is hardly a solution when the contrary norms are mixed in with the facilitative ones. Wheat is only edible when separated from the chaff. In the absence of a mechanical filter, we might infer the necessary existence of a human picker- The great human-rights breakthrough of the post-World War II period that extended international protection to individuals against their own governments for egregious human-rights violations (genocide, torture, slavery) should be reversed on the basis of one aberrant case that selected just the non-intervention norms and said they added up to a general international prohibition against forcible intervention. Inasmuch as Tasioulas agrees with Besson that the goals of soft law, and indeed the motivation for soft law, include justice, morality, human dignity, well-being, co-existence and cooperation, pluralism, and democracy, the reader might ask how any of these goals would be furthered by looking the other way while a government proceeds in a campaign of genocide against groups of persons within its own territory. A barrier to external intervention in such a case is equivalent to letting the genocide take its own course.
Perhaps the only remaining way to avoid perverse or unintended consequences like the genocide example would be to construct the filter out of the very goals that advocates of soft law wish to achieve. This might sound circular: let the Ends cause the Means so that the Means may cause the Ends. However, unlike the cart-before-the-horse aphorism, a convincing justification by Charles Taylor for inverting the Means-Ends relationship points to its utility here. 9 Taylor argues that whenever a sentient animal engages in a purposive activity, the purpose causes the activity. For example, a person who desires to go to a restaurant a block away will walk in that direction. It is the image or picture of the restaurant in her mind that causes her to move her body toward the restaurant. Thus the goal comes before the means. stripping them of their claims of equality, reducing their legal status to one of subservience (especially in the case of non-democratic affluent states), and redistributing their wealth to the world at large. Such a wholesale rearrangement of the power and wealth relationships among states would be morally required as well as serving to bring the system closer to the ideal of the rule of law.
The reader may be forgiven for wondering whether the italicized words in the preceding paragraph were meant to be ironic. However, Buchanan is drawing out the implications of the goals of democracy, justice, and morality. He does not necessarily accept the implications himself. 12 Yet surely it is/ NOT hard to imagine the havoc that would be caused in the name of democracy, justice, and morality. Nations are not going to relinquish their wealth, resources, and power, just to satisfy a scholar's argument that justice requires that they do so. People whose homes provide ample room for themselves are not going to willingly invite poorer families from other countries to move in with them and share their rooms and facilities. Perhaps they would do so at the point of a gun.
Yet Buchanan expressly disavows violence. He will only go so far as allowing legal reform to take place illegally. That there is a cognizable line between illegality and violence must apparently be taken on faith.
II. Hard Law
Hard law invites comparison with soft law from micro and macro viewpoints. At the micro level, a unit of soft law consists only of a norm, whereas a unit of hard law consists of a norm plus a coercive element. Consider a sign along a highway with the 12 See his book.
number 65. In some countries drivers and police officials interpret this sign as indicating the recommended speed limit. In other countries the sign is compulsory in the sense that the driver who exceeds the speed limit is subject to arrest and a fine or other penalties. In the former countries the sign represents soft law, in the latter-because of the coercive element-it is hard law.
Now suppose a driver sees a string of signs along a highway a few feet apart from Hard law, like soft law, is goal-oriented. The main problem with the goals of soft law was that it was imposed upon the law by scholars writing about the law. This imposition required the scholars to provide filters, which they were unable to do. By contrast, the goal of all of hard law is self-imposed; it grows out of the nature of hard law.
It is the goal of self-perpetuation. This is not necessarily a conscious goal; it has a far closer affinity to an evolutionary goal. From a Darwinian standpoint, a living organism seeks its own perpetuation even if it has no brain or no consciousness. The many living entities that arose from mutations without seeking self-perpetuation simply were selected out of existence. Over 99% of nature's species have become extinct in the course of the earth's history. Of those that survive we can say that they have 'sought' survival even though the term is an anthropomorphism; the fact is that they happened to have genes that promoted rather than retarded survival.
Nations are entities that have survived the international struggle for existence by pursuing policies of self-preservation. They are not necessarily interested in the soft-law version of international law's goals-to guide them toward the moral, the just, or the democratic. They may not even wish to co-exist or cooperate with a state that is their sworn enemy. But all states share one goal: to settle disputes short of war. For the furies of war, once unleashed, can be unpredictable and indeterminate, threatening the existence of the attacker or the state that is attacked or both. Since war constitutes the gravest danger to a nation's survival, measures that can reduce or eliminate war become a nation's paramount defense mechanism.
A state is like a phenotype that contains norms (rather than genes). There are only so many norms, which have copies in all the states. These norms seek self-preservation.
To survive, the norms are dependent upon their phenotypes. The norms seek to regulate the actions of their phenotypes in order to maximize their chances of survival. In other words, the norms of international law are peace-seeking. 13 International law perpetuates itself if the states in the aggregate perpetuate themselves. If war should break out, the entire system of states and norms would be jeopardized. In this context, anarchy means the extinction of all states and norms. Thus the goal of all the norms of international law is to steer states toward stability and away from anarchy.
Thus we find in international law a civilized mechanism invented over four thousand years ago to help states either to avoid disputes with other nations (such as drawing boundaries between states to avoid endless boundary disputes that might escalate into war), or to minimize the breadth and severity of disputes that nevertheless arise, or to provide a pre-existing set of rules that can serve as a neutral reference-point for adjudicating and settling disputes without the parties' resorting to the use of armed force.
International law can perform these functions because it is enforceable law, i.e., hard law, and for this reason, as we shall see, states take it seriously.
A. Types of international law
International law is either consensual or non-consensual. The former type is called conventional law or treaty law; the latter, customary law. It is often convenient to think of conventional law as written law and customary law is unwritten, but this distinction has no substantive significance.
Conventional law consists of treaties and other international agreements. Only the parties to these agreements are bound inter se by the specific mechanisms set forth in the treaty such as procedures for termination and dispute resolution. However, the norms within the treaty can spill over into customary law, the parties to the treaty having no power to control the treaty's external effects. 14 Moreover, the parties cannot control the interpretation of the treaty's provisions for the reason that no text can specify its own interpretation without falling into infinite regress (each interpretation must itself be interpreted, and so on). Thus the interpretation of treaties must come from outside the treaty, namely the customary international law of treaty interpretation. A largely successful attempt to codify this branch of customary law is the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. But if any provision in the Vienna Convention itself needs to be interpreted, then like any other treaty the interpretation must come from outside the Vienna Convention.
The interpretative regress reinforces what we know anyway about treaties: that they have gaps in their coverage and in any event cannot cover every subject matter that might be relevant to their object and purpose. By contrast, customary law is gap-free and theoretically unlimited. For as we shall see below in greater detail, customary law is purposive: in any case of an alleged tie or a non liquet, the tie is broken in favor of the rule or decision that tilts toward peace and away from anarchy. (Conventional law is not purposive; rather it is simply the product of the wishes of the parties, whatever those wishes might be.)
How 'Custom' Misleads
Ignoring the preceding taxonomy, many if not most commentators have somehow formed the belief that customary international law must have something to do with 14 That is to say, the parties to a treaty cannot assert their exclusivity to the norms in the treaty because they cannot control the uses that nonparties may wish to make of the treaty's norms. Prior to the twentieth century, nearly all the norms of customary international law had their origin in treaties.
custom. Pitt Cobbett started it in 1892 by likening custom to footsteps across a common that eventually becomes a path habitually followed by all. 15 Charles De Visscher in 1957 added that some users, because of their weight, will mark the soil more deeply than others. 16 The problem with these similes is that they require a time interval before the path appears. Thus, before we can identify the norm, it must be preceded by a lawless interval during which the norm is being formed. There is an Alice-in-Wonderland quality here of rules being in a state of suspended animation while awaiting news of their own birth or deletion. That very absurdity should have been enough to dispel the custom industry before it had a chance to take hold.
Unfortunately, the problem is not just one of accuracy in nomenclature. Three notorious concepts, which should have been stillborn, have been spawned by the notion that the formation of customary international law is a gradualist process: opinio juris, persistent objector, and exceptionalism. Their result, singly or in combination, has been to obfuscate the scientific study of international law to the point where we find many authors offering their thinly disguised subjectivism on contested issues of international law.
i. Opinio juris
How the concept of opinio juris entered international law has been traced elsewhere and therefore can be incorporated here by reference. govern the state. Does the Court suppose that each official can be asked, "Do you believe that you have a duty to abstain from doing X?" In the first place, the vast majority of such abstentions occurred in the historical past; the state officials have long since passed away.
Can they be briefly resuscitated for the limited purpose of such an interview? Again, to be generous, let us omit dead officials and interview only those who are, or are generally accepted as being, alive. The majority are most likely never to have thought of such a question and therefore profess no views about it. Generously, we put them aside.
As to those officials who have a view, they would most likely not want to commit their government to any position on the matter, preferring to keep their international-law options open. Thus they would reply that they know but cannot tell. However, we would most probably obtain statements from government officials of the two contesting parties to the case (here, France and Turkey). Here we should expect a clear division of opinion.
The French officials would reply that, of course, they recognize a binding internationallaw duty to abstain from doing X. And the Turkish officials would reply that, of course, they are conscious of no duty to abstain from doing X.
What is true of a purported consciousness on the part of a state to recognize a duty to abstain is a fortiori true of a state consciousness to recognize a duty to act. 22 To ask for evidence of such a consciousness on the part of a state-an artificial entity-is to make a category mistake. To attempt to prove the consciousness of state officials is both to ignore the fact that state officials tend to place their duty to their government on a higher level than truth-telling, and to make the unwarranted assumption that what a group of interviewed state officials say is equivalent to what the government would say (for surely the top officials would meet before they adopt a state position, and many may change their minds at such a meeting.) In brief, whether opinio juris is invoked in the context of abstention or action, it is totally resistant to proof.
None of this is to deprecate the importance of the use that Brownlie and others wish to make of the concept of opinio juris. They want it to serve as a filter between usages that form part of the set of obligations of international law, and those usages that are purely gratuitous such as ceremonial salutes at sea and the practice of exempting diplomatic vehicles from parking prohibitions (both mentioned by Brownlie), 23 In any event the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she had always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast.
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Speed readers have concluded that the Court was talking about the formation of customary international law. But in fact the Court was talking about title by prescription.
Much earlier in its well-reasoned but reader-unfriendly opinion the Court held explicitly that 'the ten-mile rule has not acquired the authority of a general rule of international law.' 27 To be sure, the Court's language in the previous quotation speaks of Norway's opposition to the ten-mile demarkation, but the context makes it clear that opposition is just a strong form of non-consent (stronger, for example, than saying nothing). It was this lack of consent that blocked Great Britain's claim to have acquired a historic right to Norwegian waters by prescriptive means. 28 Since prescriptive rights are specific to the territory in question, they cannot be generalized into a rule of law settling all land claims everywhere in the world. Thus the court's decision affords no basis for inferring a persistent-objector exception to the formation of customary international law.
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iii. Exceptionalism
Exceptionalism is the extreme version of the persistent-objector doctrine. It says that a very powerful state may take exception to any existing rule of customary international law. This is the ultimate realist position in international relations. The realist claims that law is only effective when it is backed up by power. Since the top enforcer of international law is the superpower, it follows that the superpower is above the law in the old (and mistaken) 30 sense that the sovereign is above the law. In short, might makes right.
The realist believes that exceptionalism is simply a description of the power distribution among nations. But he also believes that international law is weak tea. Two of the most recent realists argue that from the present point of view of the United States, international law is nothing more than a set of policy considerations. Some of these considerations (rules of customary international law) have been relied upon by other states; hence there would be increased costs to the United States if it rejects those particular rules. But in some circumstances the cost of noncompliance with the rules of international law would be perceived to be cheap compared to its benefits. In fact there is no need for the other states to take any action because the claims of exceptionalism and persistent objection have not been seriously asserted in the practice of states. Their prominence is only due to the space accorded to them by scholars and publicists. Nearly everyone who writes about customary international law seems to have a need to pay obeisance to the concepts of opinio juris, persistent objector, and sometimes exceptionalism, apparently for reasons of easy credentialism.
During the Cold War neither the United States nor the Soviet Union ever asserted exceptionalism from the rules of international law. After the Soviet Union ended in 1991, the United States as the sole remaining superpower never claimed exceptionalism.
Similarly, no nation in its international dealings has ever officially claimed that it is not bound by a given rule of customary law because it objected to that rule in the process of its formation. The reason that no nation has made this claim has already been shown: customary law does not go through a temporal process of formation.
Proving Customary Law
i. Instances of First Impression
In the short space allotted here, perhaps the most economical way to think about how customary international law is formed is to look at the way common law is formed.
Common law grows and its rules become denser over time without any external help from a legislature or a king with lawmaking powers. Every case adheres to previous decisions in similar cases-the rule of precedent or stare decisis. What about the very first case? For present purposes we do not know the facts of that case or the weight of the equities in favor of either plaintiff or defendant. And of course in addition to not knowing the facts, we do not know the law because this is a case of first impression. Thus we are at the 50-50 point, and it would be unseemly to decide the case by a throw of the dice (as perfected by Judge Bridlegoose). 31 Since the case is evenly balanced, even a slight consideration favoring one side would tip the outcome. That consideration will always be: favor the outcome that leads to greater social stability than its opposite. This is not necessarily a built-in conservative bias, at least not in the political sense. But it is conservative in the sense that the court will choose the outcome that least disturbs the public's sense of order and stability.
Why is order (peace, stability) built in to the legal system such that it factors in as a weight to an otherwise evenly balanced case? The reason is of critical importance: that the legal system, of which judges, courts, marshals, and sheriffs are a part, seeks selfpreservation against the sometimes hostile forces in a society. In order for law to preserve itself, it must have a stable and predictable environment-the opposite of anarchy. This goal of the legal system, as mentioned previously in this Chapter, is not externally 31 See Rabelais, Gargantua et Pantagruel (1533).
imposed. It is a natural result of the evolution of any legal system. Just as mankind built houses for protection against the weather and animal predators, judges decide cases that protect the legal system against the forces of anarchy in the system's environment. Just as homebuilding is a conscious act of survival, judicial decision-making tends to choose the proffered rule that promises to make a positive contribution to societal stability.
32
Of course the analogy of customary international law to common domestic law is imperfect. Missing is a key player, the neutral judge. For although an increasing number of international-law claim-conflicts are now decided by domestic or international tribunals, nevertheless the total is a very small percentage of all international controversies. Let us use the term 'controversies' for conflicts between states whether or not those conflicts are formally adjudicated in a court or tribunal. 33 We shall see that customary international law derives its content from the resolution of those controversies (the same way that precedent works in the common law), whether or not the resolution was in the form of a court's judgment:
COMMON LAW CUSTOMARY LAW
Case Controversy
Judgment Resolution
The first and perhaps most important rule of customary law is the inviolability of interstate boundaries. In ancient Mesopotamia, Hittite kingdoms were scattered over the territory. As these kingdoms grew and started to radiate outward, they began to abut Tasioulas's work), the no-self-haven rule illustrates the fact that customary international law does not require a process of formation but rather (like common law) can arise instantaneously.
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ii. Following Precedent
The archives and newspapers of the world, and now the internet, contain millions of accounts of interstate disputes, conflicts, and controversies. All were eventually settled.
Most were settled by agreement among the contesting parties. The rest simply faded away in the course of time as the parties lost interest in them.
Let us turn once again to the analogy of customary law to common law. Every judicial decision adds to the development of the common law and becomes a precedent for future decisions. Similarly, every interstate agreement that settles a controversy adds to the corpus of international customary law and constitutes a precedential norm applying to similar situations in the future. The reason that judgments and settlements have such legal power in common law and customary law respectively is that they promote peace and stability. For any conflict between persons or nations can be 'resolved' forcibly, but resort to force is anarchy-producing instead of stability-seeking. Force can always be challenged sooner or later by opposing force that escalates rather than stabilizes the situation. Hence as an elementary matter and irrespective of content, any judicial decision 36 When Sputnik in 1957 became the first artificial satellite to circle the globe, the question whether it violated the vertical jurisdiction of states it passed over was instantaneously answered in the negative: vertical jurisdiction does not extend above the atmosphere. However, a corollary was also quickly accepted: that the launching state is strictly liable for injuries caused by pieces of the satellite falling to the earth. Obviously this corollary rule did not require for its confirmation the practice of states; like the nosafe-haven rule, it was immediately obvious that any other rule could lead to instability and even war. See Bin Cheng, 'United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary Law? ', 5 Indian JIL 23(1965). or any international settlement is legally favored per se. The content of customary international law flows out of these settlements. Another recurrent analogy may be made to evolution. Plants and animals do not evolve according to pre-existing blueprints; rather, some few mutations turn out to be beneficial to the phenotype and accordingly helps it to survive and perpetuate itself. Similarly, customary international law does not know in advance the content of the norms that will enable the legal system to survive. Instead (except in cases of first impression) the norms are generated in settlement agreements.
Norms that are included in and applicable to these settlements thus constitute the 'beneficial' norms of custom, whereas other alleged norms that were discarded in the course of negotiation and settlement are cast-offs (like deleterious mutations). 
III. Coherence
The A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles the other to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or suspending its operation in whole or in part.
Thus B can either (1) suspend the operation of Article 5 on sedentary fishing, or (2) suspend the operation of Article 6 on migratory fishing, or (3) terminate the treaty in its entirety. The first alternative is not attractive to B because it plays into A's hands; A, after all, relies on sedentary fishing while B does not. But the second alternative is indeed attractive because B is its primary beneficiary.
Let us imagine that all the norms of international law are set forth in a gigantic There is a general constraint under customary international law: the deprivation must not be disproportionate to the initial norm-violation. (This is equivalent to the bar against excessive sentencing in domestic criminal law.)
Because each norm of international law can serve as the coercive element of a different norm, all the norms are connected to each other. The result is a closed system of law whose self-perpetuation is enhanced by the connectivity. Once a new norm of custom is admitted into the club (that is, the system), its strength increases by virtue of the legal connections it has with other norms. Thus rules of international law take on, as it were, a life of their own.
